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Summary: Despite a statutory definition of identity theft, there is a continuing debate 
on whether differences among the financial frauds associated with identity theft 
warrant further distinction and treatment, not only by lenders and financial 
institutions but also by consumers and regulatory and law enforcement agencies. In 
this Discussion Paper, Julia S. Cheney examines four types of financial fraud – 
fictitious identity fraud, payment card fraud, account takeover fraud, and true name 
fraud – that fall under the legal term identity theft to better understand how criminal 
behavior patterns, risks for consumers and lenders, and mitigation strategies vary 
depending upon the sort of data stolen, the type of account compromised, and the 
opportunity for financial gain. Three areas key to developing effective solutions that, 
in the view of the author, would benefit from further definitional delineations are 
identified: measuring the success (or failure) of efforts to fight this crime, educating 
consumers about the risks and responses to this crime, and coordinating mitigation 
strategies across stakeholders and geographies. 
 Introduction 
  The Payment Cards Center (PCC) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia studies 
issues in consumer payments that affect the financial services industry. An area of current focus is 
identity theft because, ultimately, these criminals are targeting financial services providers and, 
particularly, payment card providers. Further motivating the Center’s course of study is this 
crime’s potential to undermine consumer confidence in the industry’s ability to deliver safe and 
secure financial products and services.
1
  Conducting this research makes it apparent that a critical issue in any discussion about 
identity theft lies in defining what we mean by that term. A legal definition was set forth in the 
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998. In this act, the term “identity theft” 
applies to the range of illegal activities that leverage a piece of personal information – defined in 
the act as a “means of identification” – to perpetrate a crime.
2 On this basis, many financial 
frauds are considered a form of identity theft crime because they generally rely on the 
compromise of personal data. For example, a credit card number is a “means of identification,” 
per the act’s definition, and therefore, identity theft is committed when a card number is stolen 
and used to make fraudulent purchases. This definition has been adopted in practice by law 
enforcement agencies and federal regulators. 
  However, the financial services industry tends to classify the fraudulent use of stolen card 
numbers as payment card fraud rather than identity theft. Furthermore, industry representatives 
argue that the range of criminal activity stemming from the compromise of personal data (i.e., 
                                                 
1 To examine identity theft from a variety of stakeholder perspectives and to explore coordinated solutions, 
the Payment Cards Center, in conjunction with the Gartner Fellows Program, hosted an identity theft forum 
in early 2004. See the PCC conference summary “Identity Theft: Where Do We Go From Here?,” April 
2004 (http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/conferences/IdentityTheft_042004.pdf). Participants included 
representatives from the financial services and retail merchant industries, Internet service and technology 
providers, and regulatory and law enforcement agencies. This conference was motivated by an earlier PCC 
workshop on the topic led by Avivah Litan, vice president and research director of financial services at 
Gartner, Inc. See the PCC discussion paper “Identity Theft: A Pernicious and Costly Fraud,” December 
2003 (http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/discussion/IdentityTheft_122003.pdf). 
2 For additional detail, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 can be found on the 
Federal Trade Commission’s web site at www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/itada/itadact.htm. 
  2identity theft) results in dissimilar forms of financial fraud, each exhibiting distinct attributes and 
a variety of consequences for victims and lenders. In addition, these factors are fundamental 
considerations when stakeholders are developing strategies to mitigate the effects of these crimes. 
To optimize strategies to combat identity theft, the industry wants more nuanced definitions as 
determined by the specific form of fraud and by the process used to identify and respond to its 
losses and its customers’.  
  The enactment of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT Act) 
“raised the bar” on the definition debate. Now, besides using the definition of identity theft to 
trigger penalties in the criminal code, the FACT Act applies the definition to consumer rights and 
protections that assist in preventing identity theft and, in the case of victimization, in remedying 
its effects.
3 In essence, the definition of identity theft, and in particular how expansive this 
definition is in the FACT Act, determines the circumstances under which consumers and victims 
have access to the protections afforded in the act. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was 
charged with reviewing the FACT Act’s definition of identity theft in light of its use in this 
legislation.  
  The FTC, in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comment, 
proposed that the definition should be “sufficiently broad to cover all bona fide victims and 
conduct, but should be tailored to prevent individuals who are not identity theft victims from 
using the Act for unscrupulous purposes such as clearing negative, but legitimate, information 
from their credit records.”
4 Following a comment period, on October 29, 2004, the FTC 
published its final ruling, making the FACT Act’s definition of identity theft consistent with that 
already in place in the criminal code (see Exhibit 1). By confirming the expansive definition, the 
                                                 
3 For additional detail on the identity theft provisions included in H.R. 2622 The Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003, see the Federal Trade Commission’s web site at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/factaidt.htm. 
4 Related Identity Theft Definitions, Duration of Active Duty Alerts, and Appropriate Proof of Identity 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 69 FR 23370 (proposed April 28, 2004) (to be codified at 16 CFR, 
parts 603, 613, and 614), p. 6. 
  3FTC has given all identity theft victims access to FACT Act rights and remedies in cases of fraud 
stemming from the compromise of personal data (per the “means of identification” definition),
5 
including, for example, those the industry and others would characterize as payment card fraud.  
  Nevertheless, debate continues to center on one question: Does applying the broad 
definition of identity theft dilute the effectiveness of solutions developed in response to distinct 
forms of identity theft crime? In other words, do definitions still matter when protecting 
consumers from identity theft? 
  To consider this question, this paper begins with an examination of several types of 
financial fraud that fall under the legal term of identity theft: fictitious identity fraud, payment 
card fraud, account takeover fraud, and true name fraud.
6 By comparing and contrasting these 
frauds, the stage is set for a discussion of how their unique characteristics can affect the 
determination and priority given to detection strategies, mitigation efforts, and victim responses.
7  
In particular, several features of identity theft crime, including the sort of data stolen, the type of 
account compromised, and the opportunity for financial gain, are found to be key variations in the 
pattern of criminal behavior. In each case, this paper shows how the distinctive criminal behavior 
pattern has influenced responses to these crimes. Finally, to answer the question of whether 
definitions still matter, this paper presents several examples where broadly applying the term 
identity theft may hinder stakeholders’ efforts to develop solutions effective in combating specific 
forms of financial fraud.  
  While identity theft affects other groups, such as retail merchants, this paper primarily 
examines the effects from the perspective of consumers and bank lenders. Further, the analysis 
                                                 
5 Related Identity Theft Definitions, Duration of Active Duty Alerts, and Appropriate Proof of Identity 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 69 FR 63922 (Final Rule effective date December 1, 2004) (codified 
at 16 CFR, parts 603, 613, and 614), p.12. 
6 Although there may be additional and newly emerging forms of financial fraud that fall under the legal 
term of identity theft, I chose to focus on these four types. 
7 It should be noted that other names may be used by various groups to describe similar criminal activity 
but the hope is that by assigning these fraud terms and describing the activity associated with each, this 
paper will help to set a definitional baseline for future discussions of identity theft solutions. 
  4focuses on how payment cards and related financial accounts are compromised when thieves use 
them to commit identity theft. The four financial frauds discussed herein are listed in increasing 
order of their potential to result in financial losses for consumers. 
Fictitious Identity Fraud 
  Fictitious identity fraud is a financial crime in which pieces of real data, from one or 
more consumers, are combined with made-up information to fabricate an identity that does not 
belong to any real person. In a majority of cases, a completely new credit record
8 is established 
and linked to the fabricated identity. Related fraudulent activity is captured as part of this “new” 
credit file rather than that of any real individual’s credit record. As a result, typically there are no 
consumer-victims of this crime to report the identity theft.  
  The pattern begins with thieves’ efforts to build a payment history associated with the 
fictitious identity. To do so, the criminal establishes one or a few credit accounts, usually with 
lower credit lines, and makes payments on these balances as required. The positive record of 
payment performance increases the potential to obtain additional credit and to qualify for larger 
loan amounts. For example, the thief may begin by acquiring a cell phone account, making timely 
payments on the account, and following up with applications for credit cards and consumer loans, 
such as automobile financing. The objective is to open as many credit accounts as possible with a 
variety of credit providers: cell phone companies, financial institutions, and credit card issuers, 
among others. Once several accounts have been created, wherever possible each credit line is 
fully used. At this point, the thief “busts out”
9 and disappears, leaving creditors with the financial 
loss.  
                                                 
8 A consumer’s “credit file” (i.e., “credit record,” “record of credit”) is a record of how a person has 
borrowed and repaid debts. Credit files are maintained by credit reporting agencies such as Experian, 
Equifax, and TransUnion. For more information see the PCC Discussion Paper “An Overview and History 
of Credit Card Reporting,” Mark Furletti, Payment Cards Center, June 2002. 
(http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/discussion/CreditReportingHistory_062002.pdf) 
9 “Bust out” refers to the situation where thieves use an entire available credit line, monetize that line, and 
disappear leaving the credit provider to absorb the loss associated with the unpaid loan. Bust out fraud can 
be perpetrated by identity thieves as well as consumers who want to avoid paying legitimate debts. For 
  5  The bust out and disappearance of the account holder complicate detecting fictitious 
identity fraud. From the lender’s perspective, the evidence includes (1) the account has gone 
delinquent and (2) collection teams have been unable to contact the account holder. On one hand, 
the account could have been legitimate, but for one of several reasons, such as a change in 
employment status, the account holder has decided to not repay the loan and to avoid collection-
related efforts. Alternatively, the account may have been opened using a fabricated identity, and 
therefore, the account holder’s disappearance may be an incidence of fraud. In either case, the 
lender’s inability to contact the account holder undermines efforts to determine which situation 
the lender is dealing with. This same uncertainty hinders efforts to quantify financial losses 
resulting directly from fictitious identity fraud, and generally, without a clear indication of fraud, 
related charge-offs will be characterized as loan losses. One firm that offers identity-theft-
detection solutions, ID Analytics, suggests that this form of identity theft accounts for “88.3 
percent of all identity fraud events and 73.8 percent of the total dollars lost by U.S. businesses.”
10 
While a number of observers have argued that these estimates are overstated little published 
information, other than that from ID Analytics, is available to quantify the total dollar losses or 
incidence of fictitious identity fraud.  
  Despite the lack of quantifiable data, several characteristics known to be part of the 
criminal pattern have driven the development of mitigation strategies. For example, the criminal 
objective to create new accounts using newly established credit files has focused lenders’ 
attention on the application process and, more specifically, on applications from individuals with 
so-called “thin” credit files (i.e., files with limited payment histories). Lenders are employing a 
variety of measures, including the use of external databases, to further verify application data 
submitted by these types of loan applicants. For example, an applicant’s phone and address 
                                                                                                                                                 
more information on activity associated with “bust out fraud,” see the PCC Discussion Paper “Fraud 
Management in the Credit Card Industry,” p. 12. 
(http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/discussion/FraudManagement_042002.pdf) 
10 ID Analytics, Inc. “ID Analytics Announces New Data Analysis Findings; Synthetic Identity Fraud Poses 
New Challenges,” February 9, 2005. (http://www.idanalytics.com/news_and_events/2005209.html) 
  6information can be compared against a database of existing phone book records. If the data 
submitted by the applicant are inconsistent with those in the database, the application can be 
flagged as a possible instance of fictitious identity fraud and further steps can be taken to verify 
the applicant’s identity.  
  Although in most of these types of criminal cases it is the credit provider, not the 
individual consumer, that suffers the financial loss, consumers can help protect themselves and 
prevent this kind of fraud by guarding personal information.
11  
Payment Card Fraud 
  Payment card fraud (payment fraud)
12 is committed when thieves steal payment cards or 
the account numbers (i.e., credit or debit card account numbers) of existing financial accounts and 
use them to purchase goods and services. Payment fraud thieves may use the physical plastic card 
to make in-person transactions or only the card account number, expiration date, name of the 
account holder, and, in some cases, the card verification number to make transactions on the 
Internet and in other card-not-present environments. In either case, the fraudulent activity is 
generally restricted to a single account and to one or a few fraudulent transactions before it is 
detected and the compromised accounts are closed by the payment card issuer. At that point, a 
new account is opened for the consumer, and compromised payment cards are reissued with 
different account numbers. A crucial aspect of this criminal pattern is that control of the 
compromised account remains with the valid card holder and is not assumed by the thief. 
Therefore, the legitimate card holder continues to receive billing statements and marketing 
                                                 
11 The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has published several brochures for consumers describing the 
steps consumers should take to protect their personal information and the steps to take if they do become 
victims. See http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/consumer/index.html to access “Protecting Yourself 
Against Identity Theft” and “Preventing Payment Card Fraud: Dos and Don’ts.” 
12 Payment fraud is a transactional-based fraud and is referred to by some constituencies as “transaction 
fraud.” The discussion of payment fraud focuses on fraud committed using a payment card (i.e., credit or 
debit card) and does not extend to check fraud, which may be considered a variation of payment or 
transaction fraud. Check fraud deals with the manipulation of checks for financial gain.  
  7information associated with the account. As a result, consumers are in a position to detect 
payment fraud by reviewing mailed statements monthly or online statements more frequently. 
  Payment fraud has been a fixture in the payment card industry since the industry’s 
inception, and over the years, technology and consumer protection regulations have been used to 
address the problem. The payment card industry has been very successful in employing 
sophisticated detection software to flag unusual account activity. In some cases, such flags will 
even result in a call to the card holder to confirm purchasing behavior. Such technology has 
contributed to a declining trend in credit card fraud: Currently, in the U.S., fraud involving 
general purpose credit cards averages less than 0.06 percent of sales (see Exhibit 2). As further 
illustration, in 2004 total dollar losses from fraud were $788.3 million across credit card issuers 
operating on the Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and Discover networks, down from 
$882.5 million in fraud losses in 2003.
13 In the online environment, merchants are also employing 
a variety of fraud-detection tools that have resulted in a decreasing trend in the percentage of 
revenue lost due to payment fraud, decreasing from 3.6 percent in 2000 to 1.8 percent in 2004.
14  
  In addition to technology solutions, federal law limits consumer liability for payment 
fraud, although protections vary depending on whether the fraud is credit card- or debit card-
based. For example, fraudulent use of lost or stolen credit card information is limited to $50 per 
card, although, in most cases, card issuers waive this fee. For debit cards, liability protection 
depends on whether the plastic card itself is stolen and used fraudulently. If it is, a time element is 
added to the protection: Generally, if the theft of the card is reported within two business days of 
the customer learning of its theft, consumer liability is limited to $50. After two business days 
and within 60 days of the customer’s receipt of the billing statement containing the fraudulent 
activity, consumer liability is limited to $500; after that, there is no legal liability limit. 
Alternatively, when thieves steal just the account number and use it either on its own or to 
                                                 
13 The Nilson Report, Number 830, March 2005, pp. 1, 8. 
14 CyberSource Corporation, 6
th Annual Online Fraud Report: Online Payment Fraud Trends and 
Merchants’ Response – 2005 Edition, p. 4. 
  8produce a counterfeit plastic card, customers have zero liability for 60 days from receipt of the 
statement in which the fraudulent activity is reported and unlimited liability thereafter. Many 
institutions offer consumer protections greater than those required by law.
 15  
  Since payment fraud compromises existing financial accounts, efforts to detect and to 
mitigate it have focused on quickly identifying unusual transactions and putting in place practices 
to either confirm the validity of the purchase or deactivate the card. Another differentiating factor 
of this crime is that several market participants have the ability to detect the fraud: consumers 
who are actively monitoring their account activity, financial institutions that are employing 
technology solutions, or merchants who are helping to authenticate customers’ identity. These 
efforts in combination with the legislated liability protections mean that consumers face relatively 
little financial risk from this form of identity theft. 
Account Takeover Fraud 
  Account takeover fraud establishes control over an existing financial account – either a 
deposit or credit account – without the authority of the legitimate account holder.
 16 To take over 
an account, thieves acquire consumers’ information; many times an account number, Social 
Security number, and account access codes (i.e., personal identification number [PIN] or 
password) are sufficient to impersonate the valid account holder. Unlike payment fraud, where 
the fraudulent behavior is generally limited to a few transactions, account takeover fraud is more 
intrusive: The thieves attempt to steal the entire balance in a consumer’s demand deposit account 
or to access the full credit line associated with a consumer’s credit account.  
                                                 
15 For more detail on consumer protections related to credit and debit cards, see the PCC Discussion Paper 
by Mark Furletti and Stephen Smith, “The Laws, Regulations, and Industry Practices That Protect 
Consumers Who Use Electronic Payment Systems: Credit and Debit Cards,” January 2005 
(http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/ConsumerProtectionPaper_CreditandDebitCard.pdf). 
16 Account takeover has also been characterized as the “hijacking” of financial accounts. A recent report by 
the FDIC, “Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft,” presents the FDIC's findings on 
unauthorized access to financial institution accounts and how the financial industry and its regulators can 
mitigate these risks. See http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/. 
  9  Whether the compromised account is deposit- or credit-based has implications for the 
pattern of criminal behavior. With deposit accounts, identity thieves use stolen personal data to 
access victims’ accounts and to initiate either fund withdrawals or balance transfers to alternative 
accounts under the thief’s control. The objective is to deplete the available balance as quickly as 
possible before the fraud is discovered. When credit accounts are targeted, the criminal’s 
objective is to fully use the available credit line and then bust out. One mechanism thieves use to 
delay detection of credit card takeover fraud is to request a change of address to redirect mailings 
of account information from the victim’s address to the thief’s. Once the address has been 
changed, the thief will often request an additional or replacement card be sent to the new address. 
These actions extend the time available to commit fraud and increase the thief’s options for doing 
so.  
  Criminal patterns in account takeover are continuing to evolve as more consumers 
manage their financial accounts over the Internet. As an illustration, in a recent report by the Pew 
Internet & American Life Project, 53 million people, or one-quarter of all adults, were estimated 
to use online banking, a 47 percent increase over the number of Americans using online banking 
in 2002.
17 As this trend continues, personal account data and access codes are more widely 
communicated electronically between account holders and their banks. Motivated by these trends, 
thieves are increasingly acquiring technical sophistication in designing schemes to compromise 
account data stored on personal computers and transmitted electronically. Once the data are 
compromised, the anonymous nature of the Internet positions identity thieves to impersonate their 
victims and to direct account actions.  
  Online fraud schemes used by thieves to steal personal information are many and 
continually evolving. One example is phishing. This scheme involves broadly distributed e-mails 
that trick consumers into providing account and password information. These e-mails are made to 
                                                 
17 Online Banking 2005: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo, Susannah Fox, 2/9/05.  Pew Internet & 
American Life Project.  
  10look as if they are being sent from and are linking to legitimate banking sites.
18 If these attempts 
are successful, phishing provides criminals with account numbers and related passwords: the keys 
to accessing victims’ financial accounts. In 2004, global fraud losses for phishing attacks alone – 
just one method used to commit account takeover fraud – have been estimated in industry reports 
to be in the range of $100 million to $400 million.
19 However, available data to confirm these 
estimates are limited. Similarly, finding a data source to estimate total losses from the broader 
category of account takeover fraud is difficult. 
  Another method thieves use to collect the information necessary for account takeover is 
keystroke-logging software or other forms of spyware or malicious code. Keystroke-logging 
software can be hidden in an e-mail attachment that when clicked on, secretly downloads the code 
to the consumer’s personal computer. When the consumer visits his banking site, the code 
captures the victim’s keystrokes (i.e., password and account data) and sends them to a web site 
operated by the identity thief. With this information the identity thief is able to gain access to and 
transfer balances from the victim’s financial accounts. In many cases, unless the victim has 
sophisticated firewall protection, the data are stolen without any indication to the valid account 
holder that such a compromise has occurred.  
  Understanding the criminal pattern of account takeovers has helped stakeholders, and 
particularly financial services providers, to isolate vulnerabilities exploited by identity thieves. 
Various stakeholder groups have pointed out the need for better ways to authenticate consumers’ 
identities when providing access to financial accounts or authorizing purchases. Several 
                                                 
18 For more information on phishing, see Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., “Phishing: A Growing Threat to 
Financial Institutions and E-Commerce,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, SRC Insights, Fourth 
Quarter 2004 (http://www.philadelphiafed.org/src/srcinsights/srcinsights/q4si7_04.html). 
19 The reports referenced include those published by Financial Insights and TowerGroup. Financial 
Insights’ report titled “Fraudsters Go Phishing in a Million Dollar Hole of Opportunity” estimates that 
“U.S. and international financial institutions stand to lose up to $400 million in fraud losses resulting from 
phishing incidents occurring in 2004” (http://www.financial-
insights.com/FI/getdoc.jsp?containerId=pr2004_07_14_191436). In the press release announcing 
TowerGroup’s report titled “A Phish Tale? Moving From Hype to Reality,” co-author Beth Robertson was 
quoted as stating that “direct fraud losses attributable to phishing are expected to total just $137.1 million 
globally in 2004.” (http://www.towergroup.com/research/content/news_view.jsp?newsId=147) 
  11technology solutions are being considered as ways to improve customer authentication, including 
two-factor authentication techniques and biometrics, but no universal agreement has been reached 
or standard determined.
20  
  When takeover fraud involves deposit accounts, banks are increasingly imposing, or 
allowing consumers to impose, limits on the daily amounts that can be transferred out of a 
demand deposit account in order to reduce thieves’ ability to quickly clean out an account.
21 In 
addition, the FACT Act has established rules around the change of address process to limit its 
usefulness as a means to delay recognition of identity theft. With payment fraud consumer efforts 
focus primarily on monitoring account activity, but the criminal pattern in account takeover fraud 
is more complex and calls for additional preventive actions by consumers. In addition to 
monitoring transactional activity, these actions include confirming receipt of monthly account 
statements and related materials, instituting safe e-mail practices,
22 and securing personal 
computer systems.
 23 These measures will help to limit thieves’ ability to delay detection by 
requesting a “change of address” and to steal account information using methods such as phishing 
and keystroke logging.   
  Ultimately, consumers are generally protected from liability arising from account 
takeover fraud because federal regulation limits consumer liability related to the fraudulent or 
unauthorized use of lost or stolen credit and debit cards, including unauthorized electronic 
account withdrawals that don’t involve a card (for example, ACH transfers initiated online).
 24 
Unlike payment card fraud, account takeover can affect victims’ financial accounts more 
                                                 
20 For more information describing customer authentication methods, see “The Use of Technology to 
Mitigate Account-Hijacking Identity Theft” in the FDIC report Putting an End to Account-Hijacking 
Identity Theft.  (http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/technology.html#) 
21 Bob Sullivan, “Online bank fraud concerns consumers; Account holder rights vary based on situation,” 
MSNBC, December 14, 2004. 
22 Safe e-mail practices include a) never submitting account information in response to an e-mail request, 
no matter who the sender appears to be, b) never opening attachments from unknown users, and c) when in 
doubt, calling the sender (organization) to confirm the validity of requests made via e-mail.  
23 Personal computer security includes timely installation of software patches released by providers and 
installation and updating firewall and virus protection software.  
24 In addition to Furletti and Smith, see the Electronic Fund Transfers Act and its implementing regulation, 
Regulation E. (http://www.federalreserve.gov/regulations/#e)  
  12severely. A well-executed account takeover fraud may give the thief sufficient time to max out 
the victim’s available credit line or deplete the balance in her demand deposit account. The 
related financial losses for lenders are also greater because the fraudulent activity is not limited to 
one or a few transactions, but rather the entire account is often fully compromised.  
  Account takeover fraud is set apart from fictitious identity fraud and payment fraud by its 
criminal objective: Account takeover thieves aim to control the existing financial accounts of real 
consumers. In comparison, payment fraud targets existing accounts, but generally it is limited to 
one or a few fraudulent transactions and does not result in the valid account holder losing control 
of the account. Fictitious identity fraud focuses on the creation of new credit accounts, rather than 
the compromise of existing accounts, and generally its victims are the credit providers, not 
consumers. 
True Name Fraud 
  To this point in the discussion of identity theft, consumers have been in a position to 
detect fraudulent activity by monitoring existing accounts and their associated activity. 
Additionally, consumers are reasonably well protected by legislation.
25 True name fraud has the 
potential to cause greater financial and other harm to victims because it results in the creation of 
new credit accounts in the name of the consumer and without his or her knowledge.  
  True name fraud is the wholesale assumption of another person’s identity in an effort to 
gain access to new credit. In this case, identity thieves steal personal information – such as name, 
address, and Social Security number – that allows them to use the victim’s credit record when 
applying for new loans. As such, these identity thieves create access to new credit facilities, 
unbeknownst to the real consumer, which is an important distinction from payment card fraud 
                                                 
25 The Truth in Lending Act, enacted in 1974, and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, limit 
consumer liability for unauthorized use of an account holder’s credit card. The Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act, enacted in 1978, and its implementing regulation, Regulation E, limit consumer liability in cases of 
unauthorized use of an account holder’s debit card and unauthorized electronic fund transfers from an 
account.  
  13and account takeover fraud, where the criminal intent is to compromise consumers’ existing 
financial accounts. 
   As part of the criminal pattern, the identity thief will submit contact information for the 
fraudulent accounts that are not, and have never been, associated with the real consumer. 
Therefore, the victim never receives communications, such as statements, that would indicate the 
existence of these accounts and the incidence of fraud. Often, true name identity theft involves 
creating multiple credit accounts in the name of the victim, and the thief fully draws on them 
before busting out. This is similar to the criminal pattern in fictitious identity fraud except, in this 
case, a real consumer is victimized. Unless true name fraud is detected early, negative payment 
data related to these fraudulent accounts are reported to the national credit agencies and become 
part of the victim’s credit record. As a result, this form of identity theft incurs not only direct 
financial losses for its victims but also other damaging effects, such as a deterioration in credit 
scores, higher interest rates, and an inability to access new loans (e.g., a mortgage.)
26  
  Spurred by the potentially damaging effects of true name fraud and to help stakeholders 
better understand the scope of identity theft, the FTC released the “Identity Theft Survey Report” 
in September 2003.
27 This report estimated that financial losses associated with the creation of 
new accounts were $32.9 billion in business losses and $3.8 billion in consumer losses over the 
previous year. Further, this type of identity theft accounted for roughly one-third of the total 
number of identity theft victims, broadly defined, but two-thirds of the total financial costs. In 
addition, victims of new account identity theft took longer to discover the fraud than those 
experiencing fraud related to existing financial accounts and spent more time – 60 hours as 
compared to 15 hours – to resolve related problems.  
  Detecting true name fraud by either credit providers or consumers is complicated by two 
key factors: (1) the focus on creating new credit accounts rather than compromising existing 
                                                 
26 As with most identity theft, other stakeholders, including financial institutions, retail merchants, and 
other service providers, also suffer financial losses from true name fraud. 
27 To view the full report, visit http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf. 
  14accounts and (2) no obvious indication to victims that new credit accounts have been created 
using their stolen personal information. Obviously, detection strategies focused on monitoring 
existing account activity are futile. For issuers, detection efforts require focusing on identity 
verification and screening during the credit application process. Alternatively, consumers must 
have a means to verify that accounts opened in their name and included in their credit file are 
legitimate. Otherwise, consumers are likely to become aware of their victimization only after they 
have been denied credit or received calls from collections agencies or creditors. In either case, 
because the account was opened by an impersonator, the victim has generally faced a complicated 
and time-consuming process to close these accounts and to restore their credit standing. In 
particular, many times victims have had to prove that indeed they were the legitimate consumer 
and that the identified accounts were fraudulent, i.e., not opened by the victim, before such 
negative data were removed from the victim’s credit record. 
  Partly in response to the findings in the FTC report and to assist victims in addressing the 
problems associated with true name fraud, Congress included in the FACT Act
 28 provisions that 
grant important new protections, rights, and remediation tools for victims of identity theft. A key 
element of these provisions has been to help victims of true name fraud detect this crime and 
contain its effects. This legislation grants consumers the right to obtain a free copy of their credit 
report, annually, from each national credit reporting agency, to place a fraud alert on their credit 
file, and to block trade lines contained in their credit record stemming from identity theft. By 
having access to credit report files, consumers can verify that all accounts included in their report 
are legitimate and, if not, they can place a fraud alert immediately on their credit file to limit 
further compromises. Additionally, after completing other steps such as filing a police report, 
identity theft victims can block trade lines on their credit report that are the result of identity theft. 
These tools enable identity theft victims to limit true name fraud’s effect on their credit scores 
                                                 
28 For more information on the FACT Act and its identity theft provisions, see FTC testimony on Identity 
Theft and Social Security Numbers, June 15, 2004, before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, pp. 5-9. http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/040615idtheftssntest.pdf. 
  15and on their ability to qualify for future loans.
29 In this sense, the FACT Act’s identity theft 
provisions may be seen as an important source of consumer protection for true name fraud 
victims in much the same way that earlier legislation protects victims of payment card fraud and 
account takeover fraud.  
 
Do Definitions Still Matter? 
  Clearly, these four forms of identity theft exhibit unique characteristics that influence the 
risks and outcomes for victims and lenders as well as the priority given to counter-measures. At 
the same time, in each of these cases, industry stakeholders are developing mitigation strategies 
that are in part driven by the characteristics of the fraud but that also align with the regulatory 
requirements set forth in the FACT Act. As a result, the debate about whether definitions still 
matter continues to center on the question: Does applying the broad definition of identity theft 
dilute the effectiveness of solutions developed in response to distinct forms of identity theft 
crime?   
  This analysis suggests that definitions do matter and that a more refined set of generally 
accepted definitions would lead to improvements in at least three critical areas in the search for 
solutions to identity theft crime. These include measuring the success (or failure) of efforts to 
fight this crime, educating consumers about the risks and responses to this crime, and 
coordinating mitigation strategies across stakeholders and geographies.  
  Despite the legal definition of identity theft, there are important distinctions among these 
crimes, including their potential to result in financial losses for consumer-victims and bank 
                                                 
29 Consumers can get help from other sources as well. For instance, the financial services sector has 
developed a broad array of initiatives aimed at helping true name fraud victims navigate the processes 
necessary to report the crime, correct credit report errors due to identity theft, and close affected accounts. 
In addition, this sector has collaborated on efforts to assist victims, educate consumers, and share data with 
law enforcement. An example of financial services industry collaboration is the Identity Theft Assistance 
Center (ITAC). Sponsored by the Financial Services Roundtable’s technology arm, BITS, and its member 
institutions, ITAC is a centralized source launched to help victims notify and register fraudulent accounts 
with financial firms at which identity theft may have occurred. Moreover, ITAC is working to provide 
incidence tracking data to law enforcement agencies and to the FTC. 
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costs, incidence rates, and criminal arrest rates associated with the sub-categories of identity theft. 
This data gap affects financial institutions when they evaluate the effectiveness of counter-
measures targeting specific financial frauds. It affects law enforcement when assessing whether 
these types of financial frauds are increasing or decreasing and the implications of such trends. 
Also, it affects policymakers attempting to identify appropriate legislative or regulatory remedies 
to these various crimes. Perhaps most important, the data gap affects consumers’ ability to 
accurately assess their relative risk of becoming a victim or, if they are victims, their potential 
financial and other losses. As a result, consumers may alter behaviors to protect against the most 
harmful form of identity theft, true name fraud, rather than matching their precautions to specific 
threats. For example, applying an overly broad definition may result in unintended consequences 
such as creating unwarranted fears among consumers about using electronic payments and 
commerce.  
  Providing a deeper and more nuanced view of the financial losses, incidence trends, and 
other available metrics associated with these crimes assists all stakeholders in accurately 
assessing their risk and in making decisions related to their allocation of resources. To date, there 
is wide variation in the extent to which categories of identity theft crime are tracked. For 
example, little information is available to assess the extent of fictitious identity fraud, but credit 
card payment fraud has been closely monitored and reported for many years. More detailed 
research to quantify incidence and loss trends would help provide answers to critical questions 
about how we are doing in addressing specific types of financial crimes related to identity theft 
and whether we have dedicated enough resources to fighting these frauds.  
  Another area on which many stakeholders are focusing attention is consumer education. 
The Federal Trade Commission has been in the fore of these efforts and has published several 
  17pamphlets and other materials to assist consumers who are victimized by identity theft.
30 
Additionally, other regulatory agencies, industry groups, and law enforcement agencies are 
stressing consumer education in the fight against identity theft. However, the lack of agreement 
about the definition creates confusion for consumers as they search for the best ways to manage 
their exposure and to limit losses related to these financial crimes. 
More specificity in defining various types of identity theft crime would facilitate the 
development of educational materials that address the different strategies required for victims to 
respond to different criminal threats. For example, victims of payment card fraud should 
immediately report the unauthorized use to their card issuer. In the case of true name fraud, 
victims should first place a fraud alert on their credit file, obtain a copy of their credit report, file 
a police report, and contact issuers with whom fraudulent accounts have been opened. 
Furthermore, publications and web sites that explain which circumstances require identity theft 
victims to file a police report would assist in appropriately managing law enforcement resources 
and related costs.
 31 Ultimately, by providing consumers with an understanding of the various 
types of identity theft, educational materials would better assist consumers not only in accurately 
assessing their risk of victimization but also in effectively and cost efficiently responding to these 
crimes.  
  Finally, the growing use of the Internet as a global platform for consumers to manage 
financial accounts has transformed identity theft into an international crime, one that can be 
perpetrated remotely and anonymously with thieves and victims in different regions of the world. 
In turn, law enforcement, the financial services industry, and regulators need to coordinate efforts 
to combat identity theft not only within their own countries but also internationally. Therefore, 
                                                 
30 “Take Charge: Fighting Back Against Identity Theft,” Federal Trade Commission. 
(http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheft.htm). Also, see the Federal Trade Commission’s web 
site for consumer information on identity theft (http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/).   
31 For example, victims of payment card fraud do not need to file a police report in order to access the 
liability protections granted under the Truth in Lending Act or the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. However, 
victims of true name fraud must file a police report in order to access their rights under the FACT Act. 
  18definitions applied to identity theft must be communicated to the relevant parties and differences 
must be recognized across cultural and geographical boundaries in order to successfully track 
these crimes, determine criminal patterns, and fight identity theft fraud on a global scale.  
 
Conclusion 
  To consider the question of whether definitions still matter, this paper has examined four 
financial frauds that fall under the legal definition of identity theft: fictitious identity fraud, 
payment card fraud, account takeover fraud, and true name fraud. These frauds were described in 
some detail, highlighting distinct characteristics of the criminal patterns and the mitigation 
strategies for each (see Exhibit 3). 
  This paper advances the argument that definitions still matter in several areas key to the 
development of identity theft solutions. It does not call for changes to enacted legislation nor to 
the legal definition of the term. Rather it asks all stakeholders, particularly the regulatory 
community, to consider the need for more descriptive definitions in support of the legal term in 
order to help speed progress on developing solutions and, ultimately, to aid efforts to protect 
consumers from the effects of each form of financial fraud that is legally identity theft crime.  
  19Exhibit 1: Identity Theft Definition – A Comparison: 
Criminal Code vis-à-vis Consumer Protection Regulation  
 
Definition in the criminal code: Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 
 
This act made it a crime of identity theft when someone “knowingly transfers or uses, without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid 
or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a 
felony under any applicable State or local law." In the act “means of identification” was defined 
as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to 
identify a specific individual, including any 
(A) name, Social Security number, date of birth, official state or government issued 
driver's license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport 
number, employer or taxpayer identification number; 
(B) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other 
unique physical representation; 
(C) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or 
(D) telecommunication identifying information or access device (as defined in section 
1029(e). 
 
The term “access device” is defined in 18 U.S.C. 1029(e) to mean “any card, plate, code, account 
number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, 
or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of 
account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain 
money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of 
funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument).”  
 
Definition in consumer protection regulation: Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003 
 
The Federal Trade Commission’s final rule defined identity theft as: 
(a)  A fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person 
without authority. 
(b) The term “identifying information” means any name or number that may be used, alone 
or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person, including any 
1)  name, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued 
driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government 
passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number; 
2)  unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or 
other unique physical representation; 
3)  unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or 




                                                 
32 Federal Trade Commission, 16 CFR Parts 603, 613, and 614 RIN 3084-AA94 Related Identity Theft 
Definitions, Duration of Active Duty Alerts, and Appropriate Proof of Identity Under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act. 
  20Exhibit 2: Visa & MasterCard Trends in Credit Card Fraud  



























Data Source: The Nilson Report, various issues.
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Exhibit 3: A Comparison of Identity Theft Frauds 
 
Fictitious Identity Fraud 
 
Payment Card Fraud 
 
Account Takeover Fraud  True Name Fraud 
Brief 
Definition 
Pieces of real data, from one or 
more consumers, are combined 
with made-up information to 
fabricate an identity that does 
not belong to any real person. 
In most cases a completely new 
credit record is established and 
linked to the fabricated identity. 
Stolen payment cards or the 
account numbers (i.e., credit or 
debit card account numbers) of 
existing financial accounts are 
used to purchase goods and 
services. 
Control over an existing financial 
account is established without 
authority of the legitimate account 
holder. Thieves attempt to steal the 
entire balance in a consumer's 
demand deposit account or to access 
the full credit line associated with a 
consumer's credit account. 
The wholesale assumption of another 
person's identity in an effort to gain 
access to new credit. Thieves steal 
personal information - such as name, 
address, and Social Security number 
-- that allows them to use the victim's 




No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Account 
Compromised 
New Credit Account 
 
Existing Financial Account 
 
 
Existing Financial Account 
 
New Credit Account 
Loss 
Estimates 
Unknown  Credit card: $788.3M, 2004 
Debit card: unknown 
Total losses are unknown.  
Phishing estimates range from 
$100M - $400M. 
FTC report estimates $32.9B in 






Guard personal data (to protect 
against all identity theft) 
Monitor account activity 
> Monthly statements 
> Frequent online review 
- Monitor account activity 
  > Monthly statements 
  > Frequent online review  
- Confirm receipt of money 
statements/acct. information 
- Maintain personal computer 
security  
- Use safe e-mail practices 




N/A  Notification to bank/card issuer 
of unauthorized use 
Notification to bank/card issuer of 
unauthorized use  
- Obtain copy of credit report 
- Place a fraud alert on credit file 
- File a police report 





Focus on improving application 
screening process to identify 
inconsistent data and flagging 
these applications for further 
review. 
Focus on monitoring 
customers' existing account 
activity. 
Focus on monitoring customers' 
existing account activity and 
controlling access to consumers' 
financial accounts, e.g., customer 
authentication. 
Focus on improving application 
screening for new accounts. 
 